The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different iormulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and reatricted monotonicity.
We consider the problem of distributing a non-negative amount of a perfectly divisible good among a finite set of agents who have single-peaked preferences, i.e., up to a certain amount an agent likes to consume more of the good, beyond this amount the opposite holds. This problem has been studied extensively in the literature. Sprumont (1991) initiated the axiomatic analysis by characterizing the uniform rule.
He showed that the uniform rule is the unique rule which satisfies Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness and either envy-freeness or anonymity. Ching (1994) shows that the anonymity property can be replaced by the weaker property of equal treatment and provides an alternative proof. Other axiomatizations of the uniform rule are given in Thomson (1991a) using the well-known principles of consistency and converse consistency. As a result of this extensive analysis, the uniform rule is now considered to be the most interesting rule for this type of problems.
In this paper we give two new characterizations of the uniform rule, both of which are inspired by the axiomatizations of two different bargaining solutions. In section 2 we associate with each economy an auxiliary bargaining problem, of which the set of efficient allocations coincides with the set of efficient divisions in the original economy.
Next we show that the division recommended by the uniform rule to each economy, coincides with the allocation recommended both by the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions to the associated bargaining problem. The proofs are interesting because they use the principles of consistency and converse consistency in different contexts, namely in the context of bargaining problems on the one hand, and of the allocation of a commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences on the other hand. Moreover, they illustrate that consistency and converse consistency, which have been employed in axiomatic characterizations of game theoretic solution concepts (for example, Sobolev (1975) , Peleg (1985 Peleg ( , 1986 , Lensberg (1988) , Peleg and Tijs (1992) to mention just a few), can be helpful for other purposes as well. Both our results suggest that the uniform rule might be characterized by means of some suitably adapted set of axioms that characterize the bargaining solutions mentioned above. Section 3 provides two characterizations of the uniform rule. One uses axioms reminiscent to those used by Nash (1950) to axiomatize the Nash bargaining solution and the other uses axioms inspired by the axiomatization of the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solution by Chun and Peters (1988) . More specifically, the first characterization is based on an independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, and the second one is based on a restricted monotonicity axiom.
2 The uniform rule
The model
Let 1 C N be a non-empty set of agents and let M be some fixed positive number.
A coalition is a finite, non-empty subset of I. Given any preference relation R over Let E-G M, (R;);EN ) be an economy. An allocation for E is a vector y E Rt such that x(N) -M. By X'(E) we denote the set of all allocations for E. An 3 allocation x E X'(E) is called e,~cient if there is no y E X'(E) such that y; R; x; for all i E N and y; P; x; for some i E N. X(E) denotes the set of all efficient allocations for E. Sprumont (1991) showed that an allocation for an economy is efficient if and only if there are no two agents such that one gets more than his peak and the other gets less than his peak. This means that an allocation is efficient if and only if all agents are on the "same sider of their peaks. Formally, for an economy E-G M, (R;)ietv~E E
A rule is a function~which assigns to each economy E E~an allocatioñ
, which can be interpreted as a recommendation for economy E.
A rule which plays a central role in the literature of economies with single-peaked preferences is the uniform rule, see Sprumont (1991) , Thomson (1991a Thomson ( ,b,c, 1992a ,b), Ching (1992 Ching ( , 1994 ).
The uniform rule, U, is defined as follows. Let E-G M, (R;);EN 1E~and i E N.
where a is such that U(E) E X'(E).
For the case in which there is too little to divide, i.e., M G~;EN P(R;), the uniform rule chooses appropriately an amount a and allocates it to every agent with peak above this amount while all other agents obtain their peak. Here, appropriately means that the resulting division is indeed an allocation. Note that the uniform rule takes into account only the amount M and the peaks of the preferences of the individua! agents.
One of the reasons why the uniform rule is interesting, is that it is the only rule which satisfies many desirable properties. For example, it always recommends envy-free allocations. Moreover, the uniform rule is strategy-proof, i.e., if it is applied on the basis of declared preferences, it is a ( weakly) dominant strategy for each player to declare his true preferences. We now discuss four other properties, which are also satisfied by the uniform rule.
Let~be a rule.
Pareto optimality:~is Pareto optimal if~(E) E X(E) for all E E ï.
M-Monotonicity:~is M-monotonic if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN~E E,
and E' -G M', (R;);EN~E E~, with M G M', we have~(E) G~(E'). t 
Remark 2.1 Note that ES's E S. Further, if 0~T C S, then ET~-[ES.x]T'~s

A rule~is consistent if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN~E E, and all
S C N, S~0 we have, if x -~(E), then xs -~(Esf).
Roughly speaking, consistency of a rule means that, if a subgroup of agents would decide to pool their parts oí the allocation prescribed by the rule and apply the same rule to redistribute this total, then the agents in that group would end up each with the same amount as before. Thomson (1991a) proved that the uniform rule is consistent. For more details on the consistency principle the reader is referred to Thomson (1990 Thomson ( , 1991a .
A rule~is converse consistent if for all economies E E E and all x E X'(E) we
Converse consistency means that, given a certain allocation x for an economy, if the restriction of x is recommended for every reduced economy with respect to a subgroup oí two agents and x, then the allocation x is recommended in the large economy. As a consequence of the following lemma we obtain that the uniform rule is converse consistent. 
W.l.o.g. we assume that x(S) ? y(S). M-Monotonicity of~yields that~(Es~s) 1
(Es~y). Hence, xs~ys, which yields a contradiction.
(G) Let E E S. Let 0~T C N, and x-~(E). We have to prove that xT -~(ET~~)
By assumption there exists a y E X'(E) such that ys -~(Es~v) for all S C N with
S~-2. Converse consistency of~yields that y-~(E) -x. Hence, xs -~(Es~s) for all S C N with~S~-2. By remark 2.1, xs -~([ETs]S'`T ) for all S C T, with~S~-2.
Clearly, xT E X`(ETF). Hence, converse consistency of~yields xT -~(ET~r).2
.
Bargaining solutions
Before we state the main results of section 2, we first recall some notions from cooperative bargaining theory. Those who are acquainted with this theory may skip this subsection.
Let N C I be a coalition. A óargaining pmblem for N is a subset B of R f which satisfies the following properties:
(i) B is compact and convex.
(ii) There exists a y E B with y~0.
(iii) B is comprehensive, i.e., if x E B, and y E Rt, with y C x, then y E B.
Let Ci denote the set of all bargaining problems. z A solution .1-satisfies strict individua! rationality if .~(B)~0 for all B E L3. Lensberg (1982) and Lensberg (1988) characterized the lexicographic egalitarian solution and the Nash bargaining solution respectively, using a consistency property.
In order to introduce it we need the following definition.
Let B E Li be a bargaining problem for N, let x E B, and let S C N, S~0. The reduced bargaining problem w.r.t S and x is our analysis the disagreement outcome doea not play an explicit role: the reader may think of the dieagreement outcome as being d-0.
Bs.s :-{ys E Rt~(ys,xiv`s) E B}.
Note that not necessarily, Bs~s E B. However, if x-N(B) or if x-G(B), then
Bs~T E L3. This is a consequence of the fact that both N and G satisfy strict individual rationality.
The consistency property is now defined as follows.
A solution .E is consistent if for all bargaining problems B E Li for N, and all
S C N, S~0 we have, if Bs~s E 13 where x-.~(B), then xs -F(Bs~s)
For the results in this section we are going to make use of the fact that both N and G satisfy the consistency groperty. The results in the next section are based on the characterizations of N and G by Nash (1950) and Chun and Peters (1988).
Two formulations of the uniform rule Let E-C M, (R;)iEN~be an economy. Let p(E) denote the set of agents i E N for which there is an x E X(E) such that x;~0. Note that p(E)~(~if and only if
M~0. If one is interested in Pareto optimal rules, it is clear that the problem is, how to divide the total amount M among the agents in p(E), for all efficient allocations give zero to the agents not in p(E). In other words, the set of agents which are
relevant for economy E is p(E).
We now state the main results of this section.
Theorem 2.3 Let E-c M, (R;);EN~be an economy. Then U(E) is the unique element of argmax{rj;EPIE) yi I y E X(E)}, if p(E)~0, and U(E) -0, otherwise.
Theorem 2.4 Let E-C M, (R;);EN~be an economy. Then U(E)
is the unique efficient allocation for E which is maximal with respect to~~m.
Instead of giving a direct proof of both theorems, we will give an indirect one based on some properties of the uniform rule and the consistency property of both the Nash solution and the lexicographic egalitarian solution. 1.) figure l. The set B~E) in case E ás an economy with two agents.
Case 1: All agents are relevant.
Let E-G M, (R;);EN~be an economy with p(E) -N and~N~~2. Since, p(E) -N, and X(E) is a convex set, there exists a point y E X(E) with y~0.
Hence, B(E) is a bargaining problem. B(E) is called the bargaináng pmblem associated with E. 4
The following lemma shows that the operation of reducing an economy commutes with the opecation of reducing an associated bargaining problem. It also implies that, within this context, the consistency requirements for bargaining problems and economies coincide.
3tompX(E) denotes the rompreAensrve hutf of X(F,), i.e., the aet of all y E Rf such that y C x for some x E X(E).
It should be noted that B(E) representa a aet of phyaical allocationa, whereas a bargaining problem in the usual aense repreaents a set of utility n-tuplea.
Lemma 2.5 Let E-G M, (R;);EN~be an economy with~N~? 2 and p(E) -N.
Let S C N, S~0, and x E X(E). Then
B(Es~T) -Bs~s(E).
Proof. We only prove the case~;EN p(R;) G M. The other case is easier.
Since x E X(E), it follows that~;ESp(R;) C x(S). Hence,
Let y E B(Es~s) -co~npX(Es~~). Then there exists a z E X(Es~s) with z 1 y. This means that z(S) -x(S), and z;~p(R;) for all i E S, which implies (z, xN`s) E
X(E) C B(E).
Hence, by definition of the reduced bargaining problem, it follows that z E Bs~s(E). Since Bs~s(E) is comprehensive, we have y E Bs~~(E).
Now take y E Bs~s(E) -{y E R}~(y,xrv`s) E compX(E)}. Then there exists a t E X(E) with t 1 (ys,xN`s) and t; 1 p(R;) for all i E S. Since trv`s ? xlv`s and t(N) -x(N), it follows that t(S) C x(S). Hence, ts E comp{z E R~~z(S) -x(S), z;~p(R;) for all i E S} -B(Es~~). Since ts 1 ys, comprehensiveness of
B(Es~s) implies that ys E B(Es~s). Hence, Bs~(E) C B(Esf). 0
In order to prove theorems 2.3 and 2.4 for this case it is suf6cient to show that
U(E) -N(B(E)) -G(B(E)).
(1)
First note that in case~N~-2, it is immediately clear that U(E) -G(B(E)).
Furthermore, it is also straightforward to show that JV(B(E)) -G(B(E)).
Hence, it remains to show that (1) holds if~N~~2. This will follow from lemma 2.6 below.
Let E' C S be the family of economies E with p(E) -N. 
~(B(E)) -U(E) for all E-G M, (R;);ENẼ
E' with~N~-2, then .~(B(E)) -U(E)
for all E E~'.
Pmoj. Let x:-.~(B(E))
. From strict individual rationality we know that x 1 0 and therefore, Bs~s(E) E 8. Moreover, by consistency of .~ To complete the proof of theorems 2.3 and 2.4 we consider an economy
E-c M, (R;);erv~with p(E)~N.
Let x:-U(E) and S:-p(E). S~~since M 1 0. Pareto optimality of U implies that xx`s -ON`s-Consistency of U implies that xs -U(Es~s). Clearly, p(Esf) -S.
So by case 1, we have xs -argmax{r[;ESy;~y E X(Es'T)}, and moreover, we have that xs is maximal with respect to 1~m in X(Est). Since X(E) -X(Es~) x ON`s, it immediately follows that U(E) -(xs,ON`s) -argmax{jj;ESy;~y E X(E)}, and that x is maximal with respect to 1~m in X(E). 0
A similar kind of proof can be found in Aumann and Maschler (1985) , who showed that one bankruptcy rule, the contested garment consistent rule, can be defined as II the nucleolus of an appropriately chosen TU-game. Theorem 2.3 can be seen as a generalization of Dagan and Volij (1993) who showed that the constrained equal award rule for bankruptcy problems corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of an appropriately chosen bargaining problem.
Two characterizations of the uniform rule
It is clear from the previous section that, at least formally, there is a relation between the uniform rule on the one hand, and the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions on the other hand. This suggests that the uniform rule might be characterized by means of a suitable adaptation of some properties that characterize these bargaining solutions. Before we go into axiomatic characterizations of the uniform rule, we present some properties, most of which are satisfied by the uniform rule.
Equal treatment:~satisfies equal treatment if for all E-G M, (R;);ENẼ
E and all i, j E N, if R; -R" then~;(E)I;~1(E).
It is easy to see that together with Pareto optimality, equal treatment ímplies that any two agents with identical preferences get the same physical amount of the good.
Peak only:~satisfies peak only if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN~, E' -G M, (R;.);EN~E~, we have, if p(E) -p(E'), then~(E) -~(E').
This property requires from a rule to take into consideration only the peaks of the preference profile when dividing a certain amount M.
The following property, though different, is reminiscent to the one used by Nash (1950) in his characterization of the Nash bargaining solution.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIAJ:~satisfies IIA if for all economies
E-G M, (R;);EN~, E' -G M, (R;);EN 1E h, with X(E) C X( E'), we have, if (E') E X (E), then~(E) -rd(E').
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The IIA axiom makes sense only if~is Pareto optimal. It states that if all the eíficient allocations in E are also ef6cient in E', then if~recommends for E' an allocation that is efficient in E, it should recommend the same allocation for economy E. For our results we need only a weaker version of IIA which requires independence only in cases where in both economies either there is too much to divide or there is too little to divide.
One-sided independence of irrelevant alternatives:~satisfies one-sided IIA if for all E-G M, (R;);EN 1, E' -G M, (R;);EN~E E', with X(E) C X(E') such that maX{~,iENP(Ri),~iENP(~)J G M Or min{~iENP(Ri),~iENP(Ri)JM the following condition holds: if~(E') E X(E), then~(E) -~(E').
Consider the following property:
Monotonicíty:~satisfies monotonicity if for all economies E-G M, (R;);ENã nd E' -G M',(R;);EN~, such that for each x E X(E) there exists an x' E
X(E')withx;R;x;foralliENwehave~;(E')R;~;(E)foralliEN.
This axiom states that if for every efficient allocation x in E we can find an efficient allocation x' in E' such that x' is weakly preferred to x by all agents in E', then the same must be true for the recommendations~(E') and~(E), namely~(E') must be weakly preferred to~(E) by all agents in E'. This axiom is similar in spirit to the monotonicity axiom of bargaining theory, and, like in bargaining theory, monotonicity is incompatible with Pareto optimality, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 3.1 There is no Pareto optimal rule~that satisfies monotonicity.
ProoJ. Let E, E' and E" be three two-agent economies in which there are 3 units to be divided. The peaks of the preference relations are respectively, p-(1,2), p' -(2,1) and p" -(3,3). By Pateto optimality of~we have that~(E) -(1,2). It is clear that
X(E) C X(E").
Hence by monotonicity, we must have~(E") -(1,2). A similar argument shows that~(E") -(2,1), which is a contradiction.L emma 3.1 shows that if we want to keep Pareto optimality, we must, as in bargaining theory, weaken the monotonicity requirement. We are going to weaken the monotonicity axiom in two different ways. First, we are going to allow for nonmonotonicity only if one of the agents that got his peak in the smaller problem, strictly prefers the recommendation for the bigger problem. Second, we are going to require this restricted form of monotonicity only when comparing some very specific economies.
One-sided restricted monotonicity:~satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN ), E' -G M, (R;);EN~E~, satisfying X(E) C X(E'
) and either max{~;ENP(R;),~;ENp(R,)} G M or min{~;ENP('b),~;ervP(R;)}~M the following condition holds: if
;(E) R;~;(E') for all i E N such that~;(E) -p(R;), then~;(E') R;~;(E) for alliEN.
In order to understand this axiom, note that~;(E) -p(R;) means that it is physically impossible to make agent i better off in economy E. In this case we say that i's peak is binding at~(E). One-sided restricted monotonicity says that given two economies E and E' satisfying the conditions in the definition this property, ifd oes not behave monotonically, i.e., there is some agent in E' which strictly prefers (E) to~(E'), then there must be some other agent in E', whose peak was binding at~(E), who strictly prefers~(E') to~(E). The reason for the non-monotonic behavior must be that some agent whom we could not make better off in E, is made bettet off in E'. The motivation for this axiom is the same as the one for the restricted monotonicity satisfied by the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solution (Chun and Peters (1988)). For the case where the sum of the peaks is smaller than M(for instance), it implies that either all agents in E' obtain the same amount as in E, or there is an agent with binding peak in E, who gets less in E' than in E(follows the direction of his peak).
The following lemma shows that there is a relation between the one-sided monotonicity axiom and the one-sided IIA.
Lemma 3.2 Let~be a Pareto optimal rule. If~satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity, then~satisfies one-sided IIA.
Proof. Let E-G M, (R;);E~y 1, E' -G M, (R;);EN 1E E, be two economies satisfying
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X(E) C X(E'). We distinguish two cases. i88e ), : Inlll{~;ENP(`~)~~; ENP(~)} i M.
Assume~(E') E X(E).
Then by Pareto optimality of~, we have max{~;(E),~;(E')} C min{p(R;),p(R;.)} for all i E N.
Let i E N be such that~;(E) -p(R;). Then it follows from ( 2) and ( 3) that
;(E') C p(R;) -~;(E) C p(R,). This implies that~;(E) R;~;(E') for all i E N with~;(E) -p(R;).
Since~satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity, it follows that~;(E') R;~;(E) for all i E N. Since~(E) E X(E'), we must have~;(E') P~;(E) for all i E N. Since both~(E) and~(E') are efficient in E' it follows that~(E) -~(E').
C.a38 2: maX{~;ENP(R~)r L.;ENP(R;)} G M.
In this case X(E) C X(E') implies that p(E') G p(E). Let i E N be such that
;(E) -p(R;). Then, since~(E') E X(E), it follows from Pareto optimality oft hat~;(E')~p(R;) -~;(E) J p(R;). This implies that~;(E) R;~;(E') for all i E N with~;(E) -p(R;).
Sínce~satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity, it follows that~;(E') R;~;(E) for all i E N. Since both~(E) and~(E') are efficient in E', ít follows that~(E) -~(E').
O
The following lemma will allow us to considerably simplify notation. 
Prooj Let E-G M, (R;);EN~, E' -G M, ( R,)iEN~E E be two economies with p(E) -p(E'). Then X(E) -X(E') and since~ia Pareto optimal, we havẽ (E') E X(E) -X(E'). Hence, by one-sided IIA,~(E) -~(E'). O
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply Corollary 3.4 Let~be a Pareto optimal rule. If~satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity, it also satisfies peak only.
It will follow from theorem 3.5 and from example (iii) below that the converses of lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and corollary 3.4 are not true.
The following property imposes a restríction only when the solution satisfies peak only.
Conditiona! p-continuity:
A solution~is conditional p-continuous if the following holds: if~is peak only, then it is continuous with respect to the peaks.
Note that conditional p-continuity is weaker than the continuity with respect to preferences introduced by Sprumont (1991) .
We are now ready to state the two main results of this section, which are characterizations of the uniform rule, based on axioms inspired by the results of the previous section. Define the following set of agents:
The proof of (4) follows from the following four lemmas.
Lemma A: Let i E K and let 0 G q; C p;. Define q E Rt by a; -
Then f (q) -f (p).
Pmof Let a :-inf{z; E~9;,P;~~f(z;,P-;) -f(P)}.
Here, p-; denotes the vector pN`{;}. (ii) Let~~be defined as follows: for each E -G M, (R;);EN~Es The following theorem shows that if one-sided IIA is replaced by one-sided restricted monotonicity in theorem 3.5, then we can drop conditional p-continuity. Pmof. It is clear that the uniform tule satisfies properties ( i) and (ii). The following lemma shows that it satisfies (iii).
3(E) : U~(E)
'
Lemma 3.7
The uniform rule satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity.
Pmof. Let E-C M, (R;);EN 1, E' -c M, (R;)
;EN~E E, be two economies satisfying max{~;ENp(R;),~;ENP(R;)} C M(the other case is similar) and assume X(E) C
X(E'). Then p(E) 1 p(E'). For all i E N, let U;(E) -max{p(R;),a} and U;(E') -
max{p(R;), a'}. Define K:-{i E N~U;(E)~p(R;)} and assume U;(E) R; U;(E'),
for all i E N`K, i.e.,
U;(E) G U;(E'), for all i E N`K. (5)
We need to show that U;(E') R; U;(E) for all i E N. Since M-~max{p(R;),~'} -~max{p(R;), a}~~max{p(R;), a},
it follows that a' 1 a.
Take i E K. It follows from the definition of K that p(R;) G p(R;) G~G~'. Hence,
U;(E) G U;(E'). (6)
This together with assumption ( 5) implies that ( 6) holds for all á E N. But sincẽ
;EN U,(E) -~;EN U;(E'), we have U;(E) -U;(E') for all i E N, which in turn implies that U;(E') R; U;(E) for all i E N. o
Now let~be a rule satisfying the axioms ( i)-(iii). By corollazy 3.4~is peak only.
Let M E[0, M], and let N be a coalition. Analogously to the proof of theorem 3.5,
define the function f: R}~~(M) by f(p) -~(E) for some E E E(M) with p(E) -p.
Since~is peak only, f is well-defined. Define the following set of agents:
Since~iEN p~c M, K~0.
Analogously to the proof of theorem 3.5 we now have Lemma A': Let i E K and let 0 C q; C p;. Define q E R} by r pk ifkEN`{i} q; if k-i.
Qk -St
Then f (q) -f (P)-
Proof From the definition of q it follows that S(p) C S(q). Suppose f(p)~f(q).
Since can proceed in the same way as that of theorem 3.5.T he examples (i) (ii) and (iii) above show that the axioms in theorem 3.6 are independent.
